New research published by InfoStealers confirms that poisoned third-party JavaScript served across at least 21 major global websites—including BBC, CNN, Fox News, Zoom, GitLab and Salesforce—has been actively routing iOS visitors into Coruna and DarkSword exploit-kit infrastructure.
In late October 2026, we published an in-depth technical analysis examining a pivotal shift in modern mobile threat delivery. Alongside documenting how the Coruna and DarkSword exploit frameworks compromise iPhones via Mobile Safari without user interaction, we highlighted a critical evolution in the attackers' distribution strategy: the move away from disposable lure domains toward third-party JavaScript supply-chain compromises. The same strategy was highlighted by SafeDep.
That exact enterprise risk has now materialized at global scale.
Rather than breaching the backend servers of the affected websites directly, threat actors compromised or injected malicious loaders into scripts and widgets served from four widely used third-party web experimentation, analytics, and content providers: Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and minute-ly.
When visitors loaded pages referencing these poisoned vendor assets, their browsers silently fetched secondary malicious payloads—primarily 1688360[.]cc/track.js and webshell[.]lol/get.js (with complete embedded fallback payloads also discovered inside the BBC Optimizely configurations).
These payloads executed a dual-branched attack depending on the visitor's environment:
Desktop & Browser Financial Skimming: Where track.js loaded, modules inspected accessible DOM content for payment card details, swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses in transit, and harvested readable session cookies.
Silent iOS Exploit Delivery: A dedicated mobile routing branch fingerprinted iPhone visitors and silently redirected eligible devices into staging infrastructure serving the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit chains.
The verified footprint spans media giants, B2B SaaS leaders, financial institutions, and telecommunications providers:
|
Sector |
Confirmed Web Properties Serving Poisoned Third-Party Assets |
|
Global News & Media |
BBC (bbc.com), CNN (edition.cnn.com), Fox News, Fox Sports, FAZ (faz.net), Sydney Morning Herald |
|
Enterprise & B2B SaaS |
Zoom (zoom.com), GitLab (about.gitlab.com), Salesforce (salesforce.com), Hootsuite, Talkwalker, Tricentis, BuzzStream |
|
Banking, Insurance & Telecom |
Security Bank, Mutual of Omaha, Virgin Media O2 |
|
Retail, Shipping & Education |
Stamps.com, vidaXL (vidaxl.co.uk), University of Basel (unibas.ch), Chicago IT Support |
While the InfoStealers report exposes the massive upstream expansion of the delivery network, zLabs’ research explains the exact downstream mechanics that occur the moment a poisoned script on a site like BBC or Zoom routes an iPhone to the exploit server.
In our October report, zLabs warned that when front-end dependencies are poisoned—as first seen when Coruna code appeared inside a compromised art-template npm package—the threat model changes fundamentally:
"No lure domain exists in the chain: The malicious code is served from legitimate application infrastructure that users and enterprise filtering policies have every reason to trust... Any iOS visitor loading the legitimate page triggers the browser profiling and exploit staging without clicking a phishing lure or leaving the site."
Once the injected third-party script routes a Mobile Safari session into the concealed exploit frame, the Coruna/DarkSword infrastructure executes a tightly orchestrated, zero-click sequence:
For years, enterprise mobile security strategies have operated on an implicit assumption: if employees avoid shady links—such as disposable .top, .icu, or .eu.cc lures hosting dating or crypto scams—their iOS devices remain insulated from nation-state-grade exploit kits.
This campaign shatters that assumption:
Zero-Click Execution on Trusted Domains: An executive reading a morning briefing on BBC or CNN, an engineer visiting GitLab, or an employee checking Zoom or Salesforce on an iPhone requires no social engineering to be exposed. The initial script loads directly from trusted CDN endpoints.
Invisibility to Network & DNS Filters: Corporate DNS blocklists and URL reputation engines cannot block major news outlets or essential SaaS vendor CDNs without breaking business operations. Furthermore, because the exploit chains execute inside hidden, off-screen iframes, the visible web page renders normally with zero visual indicators of compromise.
Ephemeral Supply-Chain Windows: Several of the poisoned Optimizely and vendor scripts were later cleaned or rotated. Because the native Coruna and DarkSword modules actively purge Safari history and crash logs post-compromise, retrospective network log checks alone cannot confirm whether an endpoint was successfully exploited during the exposure window.
Defending against zero-click browser exploit chains delivered through trusted web supply chains requires visibility and protection directly on the device—where the exploit must ultimately execute—paired with proactive defenses against malicious web payloads.
For the full technical breakdown of the browser exploit selectors, native Mach-O payloads, and Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) behind these frameworks, read our original zLabs research report: Inside Coruna and DarkSword Chains: From Web Lures to iOS Exploitation.