Oct 29, 2025

Tap-and-Steal: The Rise of NFC Relay Malware on Mobile Devices

Executive Summary

Since April 2024, zLabs has identified a growing trend of Android applications misusing NFC and Host Card Emulation (HCE) to illegally obtain payment data and conduct fraudulent transactions. What began as just a few isolated samples has now expanded to more than 760 malicious apps observed in the wild—demonstrating that NFC relay abuse is not slowing down but continuing to accelerate.

Campaigns previously documented by other vendors are now broadening their reach to additional regions, including Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and others.

1-2

Figure 1:  List of entities that were impersonated by these apps

Monitoring of these campaigns from April 2024 has revealed the following key findings:

  • Over 70 command-and-control (C2) servers and distribution sources have been identified.
  • Dozens of Telegram bots and private channels are being used by operators for exfiltration and coordination.
  • Approximately 20 institutions have been impersonated - primarily Russian banks and financial services, but also targets organizations in Brazil, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia (Fig. 1). 
  • Hundreds of malicious samples have been detected over the period of time (Fig. 2).
  • Multiple variants were observed exploiting NFC functionality while disguising themselves under different brand names.

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Figure 2: Graph showing the found samples over the period of time

Who They Pretend To Be: Impersonating Trusted Institutions

To deceive users, these applications masquerade as legitimate services from financial institutions, payment processors, and government agencies. The following entities have been observed as the primary targets.

App / Service

Category

Country of Origin

Central Bank of Russia

Government / Regulator impersonation

Russia

Gosuslugi (State Services Portal)

Government Services

Russia

Santander Bank

Banking / Finance

Spain (multinational)

Kuban Credit Bank

Banking / Finance

Russia

Rosfinmonitoring (Federal Financial Monitoring Service)

Government / Financial Regulator

Russia

VTB Bank

Banking / Finance

Russia

Promsvyazbank (PSB)

Banking / Finance

Russia

Tinkoff Bank

Banking / Finance

Russia

National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (NBRB)

Central Bank / Regulator impersonation

Belarus

PKO Bank Polski

Banking / Finance

Poland

Československá obchodní banka (ČSOB)

Banking / Finance

Czech Republic

National Bank of Slovakia (NBS)

Central Bank / Regulator impersonation

Slovakia

Bradesco Bank

Banking / Finance

Brazil

Itaú Bank

Banking / Finance

Brazil

Google Pay

Mobile Wallet / Payments

USA

ING Bank

Banking / Finance

Netherlands (global)

 

In the Crosshairs: ‘Mamont’ Is Cybercriminal Slang for Victim

While the discovered samples share similar objectives, their operational methods vary significantly. Some applications operate as scanner/tapper tools, seemingly offered by threat actors to third parties. In such cases, one app extracts data from a card, while another utilizes a Point of Sale (POS) system to complete a purchase. 

Other samples, however, are designed solely to collect card data and exfiltrate it to a designated Telegram channel. In these cases, threat actors receive automated messages for each connected device, containing details such as device IDs, card numbers, expiration dates, and other EMV (Europay, Mastercard and Visa) fields. The messages are then posted into private Telegram channels as shown in Fig. 3

Screenshot 2025-10-29 at 7.54.27 AM

Figure 3: Data received on the threat actor’s private channel

The applications are designed to require minimal user interaction, typically displaying a simple full-screen "bank" page - sometimes within a WebView. They prompt the user to set the app as the default NFC payment method, while background services silently handle NFC events (Figure 4).

Screenshot 2025-10-29 at 7.55.23 AM

Figure 4: The app layout presented by variants of NFC malwares

The following table presents the key commands exchanged between C2 (Command & Control servers) and the malicious apps.

Command

Description

Flow

login

The app asks the server to sign in (sends credentials).

App to Server

login_response

Server replies to the app’s login request.

Server to App

register / register_device

The app provides device details (HWID, model, NFC support, IP).

App to Server

register_response

Server confirms device registration.

Server to App

logout

The app tells the server it is logging out.

App to Server

apdu_command

App forwards a payment terminal’s request (APDU) to the server.

App to Server

apdu_response

Server returns the crafted APDU reply (attacker’s answer to the terminal).

Server to App

card_info

The server instructs the app to show card info or PIN screen.

Server to App

card_removed

Server signals the card/emulation session has ended.

Server to App

clear_card_info

Server tells the app to clear/refresh card info display.

Server to App

get_pin

The app requests a PIN value from the server.

App to Server

pin_response

Server provides a PIN value (app may display + forward it).

Server to App

ping

Either side sends this to check if the other is alive.

Both

pong

Reply to a ping, confirming connectivity and status.

Both

check_status

The app asks if the device is blocked/allowed.

App to Server

status_response

Server replies with current device status (e.g., blocked, maintenance).

Server to App

paired

Server confirms this device was paired with another endpoint.

Server to App

unpaired

Server tells that the app pairing was removed.

Server to App

update_required

Server instructs the app to prompt user to download/install update.

Server to App

telegram_notification

The app sends a message intended for the attacker's Telegram bot.

App to Server

telegram_response

Server replies to confirm Telegram-related action.

Server to App

error

Server signals a problem (e.g., bad token, login failed).

Server to App

Conclusion

With the rapid growth of “Tap-to-Pay” transactions, NFC has become an increasingly attractive target for cybercriminals. These malicious applications exploit Android's NFC permission to steal payment data directly from victims’ devices—illustrating why this attack technique has gained significant traction in recent months.

The data tells a clear story: NFC is being abused at scale. With over 760 apps, dozens of C2s, and multiple Telegram channels, this is no longer isolated activity. Different actors are reusing the same concept and tailoring it to local banks and services.

Financial institutions, mobile vendors, and users should treat any unknown or unfamiliar application requesting NFC payment privileges as high risk.

Zimperium vs NFC Relay Malware

The surge in NFC relay malware campaigns underscores how quickly threat actors are evolving to monetize Tap-to-Pay systems. Unlike traditional banking trojans that rely on overlays or SMS interception, these malicious applications exploit Android’s Host Card Emulation (HCE) capabilities to impersonate legitimate payment apps and relay sensitive transaction data in real time. The result is a new threat class that combines financial fraud with device-level abuse of NFC functionality—something traditional defenses often overlook.

Zimperium’s Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) and Mobile Runtime Protection (zDefend) deliver zero-day, on-device detection coverage against all known NFC relay malware samples observed in the wild. Our dynamic detection engine identifies malicious behaviors and permission abuse patterns from the moment of installation—without relying on cloud lookups. This ensures protection even as attackers continuously rebrand and repack the same codebase to impersonate different financial institutions across regions.

As the number of malicious apps abusing NFC continues to grow, organizations must recognize this is not a niche phenomenon but a scalable, global fraud technique. Zimperium remains committed to protecting mobile users against this emerging threat, providing resilient, on-device defense against both current and future iterations of NFC relay abuse.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Tactic

ID

Name

Description

Initial Access

T1660

Phishing

Adversaries send malicious content to users in order to gain access to their device.

Persistence

T1624

Event Triggered Execution

Registers an HCE HostApduService (default NFC payment app), waking the malicious service on NFC payment events to relay APDUs

Defense Evasion

T1655.001

Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

Malware pretending to be the Brazilian and Russian financial institution application

Obfuscated Files or Information

 

 

T1406.002

 

Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing

It is using obfuscation and packers (JSONPacker) to conceal its code.

Discovery

T1426

Web Service Bidirectional Communication

Web Service Bidirectional Communication

Command and Control

T1636.002

Web Service: Bidirectional Communication

It uses websocket communication to poll the TA’s server and get the commands to execute.

Exfiltration

T1646

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Sending exfiltrated data over C&C server

 

Indicators of Compromise

The IOCs for this campaign can be found in this repository.